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The photograph must be silent, Roland Barthes declares in Camera Lucida (La
chambre claire), his famed and often-cited eulogy to his late mother. In this text too,
he says that to see a photograph well it may be best to shut one’s eyes.i Although the
relationship Barthes sets up may seem peculiar, a non-literal interpretation points to
the rewards that can be reaped by letting our affective perception do the work for us.
The poetry of Barthes’s ‘silence’ reveals an image politics that focuses on the
relationship between the viewer and the depicted. In order to be touched by a
photograph it may be best “to say nothing, to shut my eyes, to allow the detail to rise
of its own accord into affective consciousness”.ii I read Barthes’s silence like this: the
act of photographing and viewing must both free itself from expectation and then
actively resist the desire to secure meaning.iii You could think of this as meditation, or
some kind of cognitive reboot – I think of it as responsible (image) consumption and
production.
Before exploring the expansive potential of this silence through a close reading of
‘Why Are You Angry?’, a video work by UK-based artists Rosalind Nashashibi and
Lucy Skaer I would like to first declare my fondness for a poem, ‘The Windup Doll’,
by the late Iranian writer and filmmaker Forough Farrokhzad. It opens with the line
“More than this, yes / more than this one can stay silent”.iv  The words that follow set
up the scene of the observer, the act of looking and of thinking. Farrokhzad continues
with an irreverently polemic, thoughtful and detailed catalogue of all the other forms
of activity a moment of silence may facilitate: to watch, gaze, stand motionless, find,
trade, mould, “be constant, like zero”, before crying out aloud “for no reason at all” –
and in spite of all that has been seen and thought – “Ah, so happy am I!”v Like
Barthes’s, Farrokhzad’s is a bittersweet declaration. Although these silences may be
born out of exclusion, crisis, pain or oppression, they can also be willed, decolonised
positions. vi  Both Barthes and Farrokhzad indict words and images with
communicative inefficacy and introduce an alternative: the acts of looking and
thinking in silence as an active means of communicating the world and ourselves in it.
This is to say, by way of a rather broad introduction, that silence doesn’t necessarily
imply adversity. More than this, we can interpret silence as having a communicative
power of its own, fully capable of conveying and transmitting thought.
Nashashibi/Skaer’s ‘Why Are You Angry?’ (2017) communicates through images
and sounds and their absences, for the most part avoiding the spoken word. These
absences invite viewers to overwrite the film with their own images and thoughts. The
film takes its title from Paul Gauguin’s painting ‘Why Are You Angry?’ (‘No Te Aha
Oe Riri’, 1896), one of a series of three paintings depicting Polynesian women and
landscapes that Nashashibi/Skaer restaged. The other two were ‘Spirit of the Dead
Watching’ (1892) and ‘Nevermore’ (1897). These are recreated as moving image
tableaux intercut with observational documentary footage of the day-to-day domestic
lives of Tahitian women. Gauguin’s opulent ‘paradise’ is disrupted by
Nashashibi/Skaer’s inclusion of messy yards, stormy weather and grainy black-and-
white footage. The exacting sound design avoids explanatory speech. Instead, ‘Why
Are You Angry?’ is composed of shifting auditory intensities ranging from field
recordings to the total absence of sound. Their film traces the ambiguities in
Gauguin’s colonial narrative of exoticised women and far away lands. Yet
Nashashibi/Skaer’s Tahitian women replicate the silence of Gauguin’s women.  But is
it the same? By replicating Gauguin’s pictorial ambiguities through their use of sound
and its absence, Nashashibi/Skaer return to familiar questions about the representation
of women without providing any answers. The value of their open-ended questioning
comes with the decision to keep sequences mute and do away with speech acts. The
images resist a definitive reading and encourage the viewer’s active engagement in
constructing their own narrative.
The first restaging we see is of Gauguin’s Spirit of the Dead Watching (1892). The
original image features Gauguin's young Tahitian lover Teha’amana, and is thought to
deal with questions of sex and sexuality.vii It shows an adolescent nude lying on her
stomach watched over by another figure dressed in black cloak. Disagreements about
the cause of Teha’amana’s gaze in the painting, described as fearful, remain the
subject of speculation. Writing in his autobiographical fiction Noa Noa, Gauguin sites
‘tupapau’, the Spirit of the Dead in Tahitian mythology, as the cause of Teha’amana's
fear.viii Others argue that Teha’amana was fearful of Gauguin himself – the much
older, colonial, white Other.ix Reading into the ambiguity of her look is part of the
viewing experience. One thing we can be certain of is that Gauguin painted his own
gaze. What we see is his act of looking at ‘the native’ and the projected ‘authenticity’
he hoped to sell to European viewers. Although the painting purports to be a criticism
of European imperialist domination of ‘nature’ – one Gauguin hoped to remedy with
the sexual freedom implied in Teha’amana's pose – it ends up implicating the viewer
in the colonial gaze: the viewer, alongside the painter is the intruder.x Since there is
no record of Teha’amana’s own account of her experience, Nashashibi/Skaer’s
restaging of Gauguin’s image could be viewed as an attempt to reclaim this silence by
overwriting it with their own.xi This may seem incongruous. Why reinforce silence
and ambiguity? Susan Sontag offers both an indictment and appraisal of the uses and
abuses of silence in art:
Silence is a metaphor for a cleansed, noninterfering vision, in which one might
envisage the making of art-works that are unresponsive before being seen,
unviolable in their essential integrity by human scrutiny. The spectator would
approach art as he does a landscape. A landscape doesn't demand from the
spectator his “understanding”.xii
But we could also say that silence, like landscape, does demand understanding. Rather
than looking at landscape, if we consider being in it (both as observers and performers
of actions within it), the need to navigate through it, for example, and more
specifically the safe passage through a landscape, we can determine that all these
things require a movement towards understanding. The filmic landscape of ‘Why Are
You Angry?’ similarly demands navigational initiative from its viewer by means of
the ambiguities produced by the absence of sound, spoken word or any kind of
explanatory frame. This type of communicative opacity can be a position of strength,
asking more from the viewer than a speech act would.xiii In short, communicative
opacity, or silence, can invert the gaze, turning it inward.
In Nashashibi/Skaer’s restaging of Gauguin’s ‘Spirit of the Dead Watching’, a woman
lies naked on her stomach on a divan bed. Later, she is replaced by a young nude
figure who assumes the same pose. Neither of the women standing in for Teha’amana
looks afraid. The figure of Death, seated in the background of Gauguin’s painting, is
initially absent. Later, both women stand in for this figure, taking it in turns.
Throughout this scene the sound is muted, and returns with a wide shot of the young
nude with her companion seated in the background as the figure of Death. Contrasting
the women is inevitable. The women either look straight at the camera or past it. At
times they appear thoughtful; at other times ambivalent. As one of them gets up
during the first part of this muted sequence, she smiles. Reading her lips, she is saying
“Je ne sais pas”. The muted sequence invites viewers to read the silence. Gauguin’s
painting is a frozen action. We do not know how Teha’amana felt about being seen, or
how willing she was to be painted. In contrast, the film includes scenes from the
making of the reproduction. These contain the wordless negotiations between the
image-maker and sitter that we can only imagine for the original situation of
Gauguin’s painting. Nashashibi/Skaer’s interventions reassure us that the sitters were
willing participants. The predominantly silent interactions between image-maker and
sitter, including their hesitations, foreground the vulnerability of both. Neither knows
exactly what the effects of their experiment will be. Unwilling to provide an
explanatory frame, Nashashibi/Skaer intensify the uncertainty, ambivalence and
ambiguity present in Gauguin’s painting. The viewer’s gaze is turned inwards,
towards self-reflection and an ethics of care. This is, however, contingent on their
willingness to participate.
Other muted segments in the film feature joyful interactions, either among the
Taihitian women, or with those behind the camera. The soundscape of the film overall
reflects what we might hear when we are silent: the wind gets to speak; waves;
roosters crowing; the sounds of cars; the sound of the 16mm film gauge turning; the
drone of an airplane cabin; all manner of birds; barely audible music from a distant
PA system. Only once do we hear the women speak. They tell each other their names.
Although they otherwise commit no speech acts, dropping in and out of sound, this
seems to amplify their expressiveness. A certain compositional intensity is achieved
by the uncertainty of the silence. We have to account for our own thoughts and
narratives in relation to what, whom and how we see.
The second restaging addresses the painting ‘Why Are You Angry?’ (‘No Te Aha Oe
Riri’). This features a group of women watched over by a central, matriarchal figure.
She sits on her doorstep with her hand held against her face in a gesture of calm
contemplation, but it isn’t convincing. The painting’s still figures are restaged in real
time,  with moving figures, intercut with documentary images of the women in their
daily lives. As is the case with some of Nashashibi’s previous works, here “real action
and ritualised action coexist”. xiv  Remade like this, the imperfect restaging of
Gauguin’s ‘authentic native’ in ‘Why Are You So Angry?’ renders any mythological
reading of Gauguin’s scene impossible. The process of remaking renders the whole
exercise unreal, awkward, and therefore casts doubt on the project of representing
‘authenticity’. The power of the film resides in showing how the mythology or
exoticism of Gauguin’s paintings relies on the viewer’s construction of it. The
domestic and banal ‘reality’ of the staging disrupts the mythology of ‘paradise’ and
the colonial gaze. Gauguin wanted to sell paintings, and the descriptions provided in
Noa Noa work towards that goal. Nashashibi/Skaer mythologise in order to draw
attention to the conflict present in framing these images of Tahitian women through
the colonial gaze. They introduce questions about the viewer’s complicity in the
production of that gaze. Nashashibi/Skaer are aware that their mythologisation has its
limits, and that being female authors of mixed ethnicity does not give them greater
access to ‘authenticity’. Nashashibi explains that in order to break through the
exoticised colonial tropes, they set out to replicate Gauguin’s position to see if in their
hands the process of image production could inspire a different reading. By their own
admission, the degree to which they have succeeded is debatable. As indicated earlier,
their success is entirely contingent on the viewer’s participation in forming their own
relationship to the images and the questions they raise. Gauguin’s women are silent,
and since the film deliberately replicates this muteness, it is not easy to pinpoint how
the integrity of the women, their ‘wholeness’ is communicated. But it is significant
that one of the only times in the film a woman ‘speaks’ is through the soundless but
readable “Je ne sais pas”. Is it in their willingness to participate in the role-play
designed by Nashashibi/Skaer, the ways they choose to look at or past the camera,
that we begin to feel their agency? Does their silence open up other possibilities for
knowledge and understanding?
Silence, Sontag writes, “remains, inescapably, a form of speech (in many instances, of
complaint or indictment), and an element in a dialogue”.xv Its distinguishing mark is
its openness to not-knowing and not needing to know. Silence can be a way of
resisting the desire for certainty that so dominates western knowledge production and
which informs the colonial, imperial, and patriarchal impulse to dominate. Ambiguity
can be productive. ‘Why Are You Angry?’ doesn't claim to produce meaning for the
viewer and it doesn’t claim authenticity. Its use-value might simply lie in its opening
or re-opening of a discussion. The camera introduces the conditions of an open-ended
looking: undecided, unguarded, without epistemological certainty, without any
certainty at all. This form of communication, while often understood as a loss of
power, erasure or lack, can also be seen as cultivating the capacity of unspoken
thought to call another’s thought into being. Similarly arising in the context of
disempowerment, this type of communicative opacity feels to me very similar, if not
identical, to the empowered silence I described in connection with Farrokhzad’s
poem.
In her polemical essay  ‘The Reality Based Community’, Erika Balsom advocates
passionately for the observational documentary mode as a “space of attunement”
where encounters “with alterity and contingency can occur, with no secure meaning
assured”.xvi This approach, favoured by many filmmakers operating in the art context,
but also practiced within distinct historical branches of documentary, like direct
cinema, cinéma vérité, ethnographic film, and experimental and avant-garde cinema,
is to say nothing, or very little, aiming only to be there, nearby, alongside, waiting.
Insights may or may not emerge. To quote Sontag once more, “[T]he notions of
silence, emptiness, reduction, sketch out new prescriptions for looking, hearing,
etc.”xvii The “pleasure of the real” then, as Nashashibi put it in a symposium at the
Whitechapel Gallery in 2017, may be located in the conscious practice of not
knowing and not needing to know.xviii
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